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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken pursuant to the authority of Rules 
3 and 4 of the the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
pursuant to the authority of Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3, 
paragraph 2(j) of the Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the 
Olsen's motion to dismiss the Keller's claims for failure to 
meet their burden of proof after having heard all of the 
evidence at trial? 
2. Whether the trial court properly granted the 
Olsen's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to U.C.A. Section 
78-27-56? 
3. Whether the Olsens are entitled to an award of 
their attorney's fees on appeal, pursuant to Rule 33(a) of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
RULE 41(b) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
. . . . After the plaintiff, in an action tried by 
the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right 
to offer evidence in the event the motion is not 
granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that 
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no 
right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may 
then determine them and render judgment against the 
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until 
the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court 
shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). . . . 
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RULE 50(a) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A party who moves for a directed verdict at 
the close of the evidence offered by an opponent 
may offer evidence in the event that the motion is 
not granted, without having reserved the right to 
do so and to the same extent as if the motion had 
not been made. A motion for directed verdict which 
is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury 
even though all parties to the action have moved 
for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed 
verdict shall state the specific ground(s) 
therefor. The order of the court grcinting a motion 
for a directed verdict is effective without any 
assent of the jury. 
RULE 52(a) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
. . . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. . . . 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 78-27-56 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if 
the court determines that the action or defense to 
the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case 
On March 9, 1988, the Kellers filed a lawsuit against 
Mr. and Mrs. Olsen, alleging that the Olsens intentionally 
and maliciously poisoned and destroyed a row of spruce trees 
growing between the parties1 properties. The Kellers further 
accused the Olsens of trespassing onto the Keller property 
and violating Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-38-3. 
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b. Course of the Proceedings 
The matter came before the Court in a bench trial on 
September 20, 1988, before the Honorable Judge David S. 
Young, in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County. At 
the conclusion of the Keller's case, counsel for the Keller's 
rested. The Olsens made motion to the court at that time for 
the entry of a directed verdict. The Court, sitting without 
a jury, granted the Olsen's motion to involuntarily dismiss 
all of the Keller's claims on the basis that they had failed 
to establish a prima facie case against the Olsens or to meet 
their burden of proof on any of their allegations. 
Subsequently, the Olsens filed a motion for an award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-
27-56. That motion was argued to the court on October 17, 
1988. The Court ruled that the Olsens were entitled to their 
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-27-56. 
c. Disposition of the Case by the Trial Court 
The Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and Judgment in favor of the Olsens on October 24, 
1988. Thereafter the Court entered Judgment on plaintiff's 
motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs on November 1, 1988. On 
November 23, 1988, the Kellers filed their Notice of Appeal 
as to both Judgments. 
d. Relevant Facts 
Vaughn and Jeanne Keller are the owners of certain real 
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property located in West Jordan, Utah. (Record p. 7, lines 
14-25; Record p. 109, lines 14-18). Vaughan Keller's parents 
lived on the subject property in a trailer home since 
approximately 1960. (Record p. Ill, lines 7-8), and had a 
good relationship with their neighbors, the Olsens. (Record 
p. 27, lines 18-22; p. 97, lines 15-18; p. 121, lines 9-22). 
Mr. Keller, the father, passed away in 1983, and Mrs. Keller, 
the mother, passed away in 1984. (Record p. 27, lines 18-22; 
p. 97, lines 15-18; p. 121, lines 9-22). John and Faye Olsen 
have resided next door to the Keller residence since November 
1974. (Record p. 96, lines 14-16). 
There were at one time fourteen blue spruce trees on the 
northern border of the Keller property. (Findings at para. 
6). At some point before his death, Mr. Keller, the father, 
had problems with his heart (Record p. 97, lines 5-14), and 
was unable to care for the trees. (Record p.97, lines 22-
23). Mr Olsen requested permission to trim the trees, and 
Mr. Keller consented (Record p. 97-98). 
In the Spring of 1985, some of the trees started to show 
signs of a purple tinge to the branches. (Record p. 29, 
lines 3-12; Record p. 118, lines 9-25; p. 119, lines 1-3). 
At the time of trial, twelve of the fourteen trees on the 
northerly border of the Keller property had died. (Findings 
at para. 6). The Olsens also had problems getting anything 
to grow in the area between the parties1 properties. (Record 
p. 108, lines 2-10). 
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Both Vaughn and Jeanne Keller offered unsupported 
testimony that they believed the trees had been damaged or 
poisoned by the Olsens. (Record p.50, lines 21-22; Record p. 
123, lines 10-24; Record p. 132, lines 3-25 p. 133, lines 1-
10) . 
The Kellers also attempted to have the soil beneath the 
trees analyzed, but were informed that a soil test was 
ineffective for such a problem and that any foreign substance 
present in the soil would dissipate quite readily. (Record p. 
46, lines 4-8). 
The Keller's expert testified that he found evidence of 
red spider mite in one of the trees which could have 
contributed to the demise of the trees. (Record p. 86, lines 
10-23). The most damaging testimony however, came from the 
Keller's own expert when he testified that he couln't say 
with any certainty what caused the damage to the trees. 
(Record p. 89, lines 16-18; Record p. 93 lines 14-17; Record 
p.14, lines 24-25; p. 142, lines 1-7; Record p. 144, lines 6-
19). 
Absolutely no evidence whatsoever was presented to 
support the Keller's third cause of action for punitive 
damages. (Record p. 140, lines 18-24). There was also no 
testimony which would have afforded the trial court any basis 
to conclude that the Olsens caused the problem with the 
trees. (Record p. 142, lines 4-7). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly dismissed the Keller's claims 
for failure to establish a prima facie case and to meet their 
burden of proof concerning the allegations in the complaint. 
The Findings and Judgments of the trial court are 
substantiated by the evidence, or lack thereof, which was 
adduced at trial. 
The trial court correctly found that the Kellers failed 
to prove what caused the death of the blue spruce trees, and 
that they failed to prove that the Olsens intentionally, or 
otherwise, sought to poison or destroy the blue spruce trees 
or the lawn belonging to the Kellers. The trial court 
properly concluded that there was no evidence to support a 
claim for punitive damages, no evidence that the Olsens 
committed a trespass, and no evidence that the Kellers were 
entitled to recover damages pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-38-
3. 
Finally, the trial court was justified in awarding the 
Olsens their attorneyfs fees and costs pursuant to U.C.A. 78-
27-56, based on the fact that the Keller complaint was 
without merit and lacking in "good faith". Because 
appellants have failed to provide the court a complete 
record, the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs 
should be afforded a presumption of validity and upheld. 
Inasmuch as the Kellers have failed to meet their burden 
in showing that the trial court erred in its decisions, 
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accordingly the judgments below should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE KELLERS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN 
OF SHOWING SUBSTANTIAL ERROR ON THE PART OF THE 
TRIAL COURT SO AS TO WARRANT A CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
As appellants, the Kellers bear the substantial 
burden of establishing that the trial court committed 
reversible error. Their challenge to the findings and 
judgment of the trial court requires that they sustain the 
burden of showing "clearly erroneous" reversible error. Rule 
52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The appropriate standard of review applicable to a 
challenge of the trial court's findings and judgment is that 
the appellate court should regard the trial court's finding 
and judgment with a presumption of validity and correctness. 
Rule 52(a) Utah R.Civ.P.; Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 
(Utah 1989); Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 
1988); Hatcheson v. Gleave. 632 P.2d 815 (1981); Kohler v. 
Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (1981). 
The Kellers are required to sustain that burden of 
showing error, based upon a review by the appellate court 
with a presumption of validity to the findings and judgment 
of the trial court. Further, the record must be construed in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial 
court level. The decision of the trial court should not be 
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disturbed unless the appellate court finds substantial 
support for such reversal in the evidence. Doelle v. 
Bradley, supra: Cornish Town v. Roller, supra: Hatcheson v. 
Gleave, supra: Kohler v. Garden City, supra. 
To successfully attack findings of fact, an appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence supporting the findings 
and then demonstrate that, even if viewed in light most 
favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings. Doelle v. Bradley, 
supra: Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 776 P. 2d 
896, 899 (Utah 1989); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989); Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 
1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
The legal sufficiency of the evidence is determined under 
Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(A). A trial court's factual finding is deemed 
"clearly erroneous" only if it is against the clear weight of 
evidence. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, supra, 
776 P.2d at 899-900; In re Estate of Bartell, supra, 776 P.2d 
at 886; See alsof Western Rane County Special Service, Dist. 
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). 
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In the present case, the Kellers have not attempted to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
or demonstrate that the evidence supporting the findings is 
legally insufficient. Their brief repeatedly argues that 
reasonable minds could differ concerning the cause for the 
demise of the subject trees, but ignores the fact that the 
judge was the trier of fact, and after hearing the entirety 
of Plaintiff's case, determined that they had not met the 
requisite burden of proof. There is therefore no reason to 
disturb the trial court's findings or judgments. 
The Kellers base their appeal on basically two areas in 
which they claim the trial court committed reversible error. 
First, the Kellers argue that the court was required to find 
that there was basis upon which reasonable minds, acting 
fairly, could so find as to require a denial of the Olsen's 
motion to dismiss (directed verdict). (Appellant's Brief at 
5, 10, and 15.) Secondly, the Kellers contend that the trial 
court's award of attorney's fees to the Olsens, pursuant to 
Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code, was improper because (a) 
the filing of the complaint was not without merit, and (b) 
that the action was brought in good faith. (Appellant's 
Brief at 15-19). 
With regard to the first point, the Kellers rely on 
several appellate decisions involving jury trials, wherein 
the court granted directed verdicts. Although the Olsen's 
motion for dismissal presented to the court at the conclusion 
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of Plaintiffs1 case, took the form of a motion for directed 
verdict, in reality the court treated it as a motion for 
dismissal under Rule 41(b). The trial court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, each reflect that 
the Court granted the Olsen's a motion for involuntary 
dismissal. (Findings, para. 7-8; Conclusions of Law, para. 
2-5; Judgment p.2). 
The Court's findings and judgment are consistent with 
the provisions of Rule 41(b), which specifically requires the 
Court to enter it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Wherein the trial court was the trier of fact in this case, 
the court's treatment of the Olsen motion as one for 
involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) was proper. The 
Findings and Judgment should not be disturbed on appeal 
without a clear and convincing showing that the court 
committed reversible error. 
The trial court heard all of the evidence presented by 
the Kellers to support their various claims. The evidence 
presented by the Kellers simply did not support their claim 
that the defendants caused the demise of their trees. 
Absolutely no evidence was presented to support the Keller's 
claim that Mr. and Mrs. Olsen had trespassed upon their 
property. Despite representations to the contrary in the 
Keller's appellate brief, their own expert testified that he 
could not determine with any degree of certainty as to what 
actually caused the demise of the trees. (Record p. 93, line 
10 
14-17, Record p. 88, lines 10-13; Record p. 89, lines 10-18. 
The standard of appellate review, as enumerated in Rule 
52(a), and recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah Court of Appeals, dictates that appellants bear a 
significant burden to show that the trial court committed 
substantial error in making the findings and judgment which 
it did. The legal presumption that the trial court's 
findings and judgment are valid and correct must be overcome 
by a compelling showing that the trial court committed 
reversible error. 
The Kellers have not made such a showing nor have they 
overcome that burden, particularly when one considers that 
the record on review must be construed in the light most 
favorable to the Olsens in this case. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN 
IT DISMISSED PLAINTIFFfS CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE, 
AFTER HAVING HEARD THE ENTIRETY OF 
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE 
At the close of the Keller's case, counsel for the 
Olsen's made a motion for directed verdict on the basis that 
the Kellers failed to meet their burden of proof on all 
elements of the causes of action alleged in their complaint. 
(Record, p. 137, lines 7-15). In effect, the court treated 
that motion as one for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 
41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and held that the 
Kellers had failed to meet their burden of proof on all of 
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their allegations. (Record, p. 140-143; Findings, para. 7-8; 
Conclusions of Law, para. 2-5). 
In ruling on a motion for directed verdict or non-suit, 
it is well established that where a jury sits, the court 
should consider all evidence in the light most favorable to 
the party against whom it is directed. Virginia S. v. Salt 
Lake Care Center, 741 P. 2d 969 (Utah App. 1987); Management 
Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, 
Inc. , 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982); Kim v. Anderson. 610 
P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980); Asay v. Rappleye. 593 P.2d 132 (Utah 
1979). However, in the case where the court sits without a 
jury, a different situation arises. "This fundamental 
distinction between jury and non-jury trials should not be 
ignored." Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 252 P. 2d 205, 206-
207 (Utah 1953). 
Where the judge is the trier of fact, Rule 41(b) must be 
applied. The judge may appropriately grant a motion for 
dismissal if he finds that the claimant has either failed to 
make out a prima facie case or when the trial judge is not 
persuaded by the evidence presented by the claimant. Lemon 
v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58 (Utah 1987); Wessel v. Erickson 
Landscaping, 711 P.2d 250, 252, (Utah 1985). 
Rule 41(b) provides in part: 
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the 
court without a jury, has completed the presentation of 
his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to 
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, 
may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the 
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to 
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relief. The court as trier of the facts may then 
determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff 
or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the 
merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make 
findings as provided in Rule 52(a). . . . 
The court pointed out in Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc. , 
supra, that this rule applies only in non-jury cases where 
the court sits as the fact finder. In that case the court 
quoted approvingly from United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co., 67 F.Supp. 397, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1946) where the rule was 
explained and justified in the following words: 
When a court sitting without a jury has heard all 
of plaintiff's evidence, it is appropriate that the 
court shall then determine whether or not the plaintiff 
has convincingly shown a right to relief. It is not 
reasonable to require a judge, on motion to dismiss 
under rule 41(b), to determine merely whether there is a 
prima facie case, such as in a jury trial should go to 
the jury, when there is no jury - to determine merely 
whether there is a prima facie case sufficient for the 
consideration of a trier of the facts when he is himself 
the trier of the facts. To apply the jury trial 
practice in non-jury proceedings would be to erect a 
requirement compelling a defendant to put on his case 
and the court to spend the time and incur the public 
expense of hearing it if the plaintiff had, according to 
jury trial concepts, made "a case for the jury," even 
though the judge had concluded that on the whole of the 
plaintiff's evidence the plaintiff ought not to prevail. 
A plaintiff who has had full opportunity to put on his 
own case and has failed to convince the judge, as trier 
of the facts, of a right to relief, has no legal right 
under the due process clause of the Constitution, to 
hear the defendants' case or to compel the court to hear 
it, merely because the plaintiff's case is a prima facie 
one in the jury trial sense of the term. 
Id. 252 P.2d at 207. For a further discussion of the 
rule and its application, see also. Lawrence v. Bamberger 
R-R- Co.. 3 Utah2d 247, 282 P.2d 335 (1955); and 55 A.L.R.3d 
272 (1974), and cases cited therein. 
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Thus in the instant case the trial court sitting as 
finder of the facts was entitled at the end of the 
plaintiffs1 presentation of evidence to weigh that evidence, 
and if it found it to be unbelievable or insufficient in some 
regard, to make a ruling on the merits of the evidence and 
dismiss the complaint. See also, Johnson V. Bell, 666 P.2d 
308 (Utah 1983) . 
In reviewing involuntary dismissals, appellate courts 
must give great weight to the findings made and the 
inferences drawn by the trial judge, and only reverse them if 
they are clearly erroneous. Southern Title Guar. Co. v. 
Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Lemon v. Coates, supra; Wessel v. 
Erickson Landscaping Co., supra. 
The Kellers have not demonstrated that the trial court's 
Findings and Judgment were clearly erroneous. They have 
failed to marshal the evidence in any way so as to support a 
claim that the trier of fact was in error. Accordingly, this 
Court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED DEFENDANTS THEIR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
On October 17, 1988, approximately one month after 
the trial of this case, the trial court heard argument on the 
Olsen's motion for their attorney's fees and costs pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-56. After hearing and 
argument, the court granted the Olsen's motion, and 
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accordingly awarded to them their reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs. A record was made of that proceeding, although 
the appellants herein have never requested a transcript of 
the hearing. 
The Kellers have failed to provide the Court of Appeals 
a transcript of the proceedings below concerning the Motion 
for Attorney's Fees and Costs pursuant to Section 78-27-56. 
This Court has repeatedly held that an appellant may not 
succeed on a claim of error when relevant portions of the 
record are not before it; in such a case, the proceedings 
before the trial court are presumed to support the trial 
court's findings. Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919, 922 
(Utah 1988); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498, 498 (Utah 1986) 
(per curiam); Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 
1984); see In re Cluff's Estate, 587 P.2d 128, 128 n. 1 (Utah 
1978); see also. Union Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Kakaako, 5 
Haw.App. 146, 149-153, 682 P.2d 82 (1984). 
In the event that the court determines to review the 
trial court's award of attorney's fees, the two elements for 
review are (1) whether the action was without merit, and (2) 
whether it was brought in "good faith". Cady v. Johnson, 671 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
Relative to the term "without merit", it was stated in 
Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Back, 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964), 
that the term implies "bordering on frivolity". The 
dictionary definition of "frivolous" is "of little weight or 
15 
importance having no basis in law or fact." While there may 
be some distinction between these two terms in other areas of 
the law, for purposes of this statute the terms are 
synonymous. Cady v. Johnson, supra. 671 P.2d at 151. 
In addition to finding the claim to lack merit, the 
trial court must also find that plaintiffs1 conduct in 
bringing suit was lacking in good faith. In Tacoma Assoc, of 
Credit Men v. Lester. 72 Wash.2d 453, 458, 433 P.2d 901, 
(1967), the court defined "good faith" as: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the activities 
in question (2) no intent to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge 
of the fact that the activities in question will, [sic] 
hinder, delay or defraud others. 
Cady v. Johnson, supra. 671 P.2d at 151. 
In dismissing the Keller's claims, the trial court 
addressed each of the allegations in the complaint. (Record 
at pp. 140-144). The Court specifically stated that there 
was "no testimony that would give me any basis upon which I 
can conclude that there s a legitimate basis for me to 
conclude that the defedants caused the problem." (Record p. 
142, lines 4-8). Further, the Court went on to say, "I think 
that this complaint is being pursued more because of a 
nuisance than anything and that, to me, I think, it is very 
unfortunate because it puts me in a difficult spot." (Record 
p. 142, lines 17-20). 
Respondents assert that without the record, the court 
has no alternative but to presume the validity of the trial 
16 
courl findings, Notwithstanding, respondents submit the 
trial court also found thar Kener's action was without 
merit and lacked the element: * "^. - faith", and accordingly 
1 1 idc| ini t - ' ii 1 II II mi I in III. 1 1 1 f
 r iinil r o s t s s h n 11 I rl b e 
affirmed. 
I' '. PURSUANT TO RULE 33A, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDI IRE 
DEFENDANTS REQUEST AN AWARD OF THEIR COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES RELATED TO THIS APPEAL 
The Olsens request the Court award to them their 
r e a s t in thtb 11" n d i IMK| I I III i • i 
appeal. In support of thei r request, the Olsens cite the 
Court t.- * *: :> decision in Eames v^ Eames , 735 P. 2d 395 (Utah 
App. h i * Therein, the ( determined .^ 
appellants claims appeal were frivolous and failed t.> 
and costs. 
Subsequently, i n the case of O'Brien v. Rush, , 2d 
3 :: :> (i: J t a t 2 i I j: 1 98 ; ]i I hi C in ill I 
trial court's award of attorneyfs fee.^ vas appropriate r.. 
consider the " " faith" elemen~ * * subjective 
Li 1, d J id an 1 J •. inappropriate 
(Emphasis added). 
Rule 33(a) states that attorney fees may be awarded when 
the "motion made or an appeal taken under these rules is 
either* frivolous or for delay 
"The 01 seiir,, o ::>! l tei id 
17 
basis for appeal of the trial court's findings or judgment of 
September 20, 1990, nor is there merit to the challenge of 
the trial court's judgment for attorney's fees and costs, 
entered on November 1, 1988. For this reason, the Olsens 
respectfully request the Court to award them their attorney's 
fees and costs related to this appeal pursuant to Rule 33(a). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the trial court's findings and judgments, the 
void of evidence in the record to support the claims of the 
Kellers, and the foregoing arguments and legal precedent 
which support the finding and judgments, the Olsens 
respectfully submit that the decisions of the trial court 
must be upheld. The Olsens further request the Court to 
award to them their reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
related to this appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /' *' /day £>f September, 
1990. 
TIANSEN, P.C. 
for Appellee 
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"EXHIBIT A" 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN, P.C. 
MUELLER, CHRISTIANSEN & MCLELLANI.) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
777 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-3762 
mHE THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN and JEANNE KELLER, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) FINDINGS OF FACT 
) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
- \ i s ) 
MR. and MRS. JOHN OLSEN, ) 
) I • 1, V I l IN tl 113 d I i J i 
Defendants. ) Judge Davi.: Young 
This matter came regularly before the 
u e m b e r Honorable David 
Young, Utah State District Judge, presiding; Dean Becker 
appearing for plaintiffs,, Vaughn 
"KelJ ei: s'"' ); Ker , t I Christiansen Mueller, Christiansen and 
McLelland, appearing for IIIII defendants Joh * Faye Olsen 
(hereinafter the "Olsens" l 
evidence by was of testimony and documentary exhibits and having 
argued the matter -* r* ,-*-•.» having reviewed the 
arties and being 
fully advised premises, and good cause appearing, now, 
1 
0 fo-iz 
therefore, the court hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Kellers are the owners of that certain 
real property located at 6853 South 1300 West, West Jordan, Utah. 
2. That the Olsens are the owners of that certain real 
property which borders the Keller property on the north, located 
at 6841 Anderson Way, West Jordan, Utah. 
3. The claims of the Kellers against the Olsens arose 
in Salt Lake County and involve a controversy in excess of 
$10,000.00. 
4. This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter. 
5. There exist along the north border of the Keller's 
property a dense row of fourteen (14) Blue Spruce trees. 
6. That of the fourteen (14) Blue Spruce trees which 
exist on the northern border of the Keller's property, twelve 
(12) of the trees are completely dead. 
7. The Kellers have failed to adduce evidence proving 
what actually caused the death of the Blue Spruce trees. 
8. The Kellers have failed to adduce evidence to prove 
that the Olsens intentionally, or otherwise, sought to poison or 
destroy the Blue Spruce trees or the lawn belonging to the 
Kellers. 
9. That the twelve (12) dead Blue Spruce trees which 
form the border on the northern side of the Keller's property 
2 
constitute dangerous and unhealthy condition such tha^ t 
effect's 111 i r 1 i l l i II in J t y n i h n i i l n i l l i f e • -i r 1M.IT pi ope My i e 
O l s e n s . 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court draws 
t i l t : I I » II 1 O W I II I | I 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That this court has jurisdiction to decide the 
disputed claims between the Kellers against the Olsens. 
2 ill mi in ill r i iiiijJiL'ij aiJitJuc e d j l i i i a 1 l a i i a I n s u p p u i t 
the Keller's claim that: the Olsens are liable in any way for the 
death or destruction of the Blue Spruce trees. 
adduce i support 
the Keller's claim for trespass. 
:he evidence adduced at trial fail ; t 
the Relic «^»<= violated Section 78-38-3, Utah 
Code Ann. 1953 as amended). 
T h - mi mi i i I mi mi mi mi in i in i i in I f H in m m I 11 I I Il in i I I i in i s 
recoverable as against the Olsens. 
6 Tha t tl: le twelve (12) dead Blue Spruce trees which 
form the bor dez ::  • I tl i =! Hi i I h n r n ^ 1i i I  i «i I I I i n K e l I e i "' i n i i p n i t y 
constitute a nuisance, and that the Kellers are ordered to abate 
said nuisance by removing the trees before October 20, 
198P 
motion for Involuntary Dismissal 
should be granted against the Kellers in accordance herewi I h in r i 
3 
an appropriate Judgment of Dismissal entered. 
DATED this of October, 1988. 
David S. Yo 
District O 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ATTEST 
H D»XON HURLEY 
Dtrp^cy C'a.rK 
By: 
Dean Becker 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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"EXHIKH 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN, P.C. 
MUELLER, CHRISTIANSEN &
 M C L E L L A N D 
Attorneys for Defendants 
777 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-3762 
OCT o >m 
>>.: 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN and JEANNE KELLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
MR, and MRS. JOHN OLSEN, 
Defendants• 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-1559 
Judge David S. Young 
Tli i 1 s in.'i I't I " mi i iiiiiii ill in in H I ( i i 1 a i I y I m II i J I « I  l i e c o u r "^ 3 
non-jury trial September 20 1988, the Honorable David s 
Young, Utah State District Judge# presidina 
appearing Vaughn
 ancj Jeanne Keller (hereinafter 
"Kellers"); Kent Christiansen of Mueller, Christiansen and 
McLelland, appearing for the defendants Johr 
» Lsens" parties having adduced 
evidence by way of" testimony and documentary exhibits and having 
argued the matter in the court .rintl II i r n m I Im LI'HJ I H Mi«=f » i ,1 l l i i » 
f exhibits and memoranda submitted by the parties and being 
fully advised i n the premises, and good cause appearing, now, 
therefore, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs, 
Vaughn and Jeanne Keller, are ordered to abate the unlawful 
nuisance which exists on their property at 6853 South 1300 West, 
West Jordan, Utah, to wit, twelve (12) dead Blue Spruce trees 
located on the northern boundary of said property; and are hereby 
ordered to remove said trees on or before October 20, 1988. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Olsen's motion for 
dismissal of all claims with prejudice is granted against the 
Kellers, and judgment of said dismissal with prejudice is entered 
herewith. 
DATED this £j & y of October, 1988. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
By: 
David S. Younj 
D i s t r i c t Court Ju/dge 
ATTEST 
H. DVAOH Ni*#DLEY 
Own* 
By 
Dean Becker 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
Dcpcry Z'-r* 
2 
"EXHIBIT L 
. / 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN, P.C. 
MUELLER, CHRISTIANSEN & MCLELLAND 
Attorneys for Defendants 
777 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-3762 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN , u: l : I 3 EANNE KEI .1 «ER 
i" i • i i n *• i f » » : s 
-vs 
MR. and MRS. JOHN OLSEN, 
Defendants. 
^/¥36^S? 
//-£-## f :si8>r.fll. 
J UDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS 
Civil No C88-1559 
Judge David S. Young 
hearirT -:: defendant1 » - - * Attorney ^; ees Pursuer t • , 
Utah Code Ann., Section 7Q-KA~r7 (i,g^ 3 ,^ amended October 
-I * - istr ict 
Judge, presiding; Dean Becker appearing for p.*inti*fs Vaughn 
and Jeanne Re] 1 er (hereinafter f,Ke1 N-rr" * Kent L. Christiansen 
: Ii: I Ii iel 3 e i: CI: it; c:i st : in sen and -.-...: '' appearing for the 
defendants John and Faye 01 sen (hereinafter the '.'isens"" • and 
the parties having adduced evidence 
having argued the matter to the roui t »uu - :ie c-.-irl having 
reviewed the file, exhibits and memoranda submitted by the 
1 
parties and being fully advised in the premises, and good cause 
appearing, now, therefore, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendants, 
John and Faye Olsen are awarded their reasonable attorney's fees 
in the amount of $3,126.50, together with their costs of $324.75, 
for a total of $3,451.25; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that this judgment shall be 
augmented by an amount of twelve percent (12%) per annum, post-
judgment interest, until such time as it shall be fully 
satisfied; and by an amount equivalent to the reasonable 
additional attorney's fees and costs expended to collect said 
judgment, as shall heretofore be established by affidavit. 
DATED this _jNf^ -"day of -October-, 1988. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David S. Yo; 
District C 
By 
By: 
Dean Becker 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice before 
/l6 the Utah District Courts, I hereby certify that on the day 
2 
of October, ] 988, * i-i;V^ i • ^ .. - ;d correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment f-- Attorney > ees ar, 1 ^ ^ts Pursuant v Utah 
Code Ann,» , Section ' as amended; to 1 he P..
 4I:I.I if f f s 
Attorney, by placing the same 111 tlle Mails, and properly 
addressed as fol "lows: 
Dean H. Becker 
Attorney at Law 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
V . 
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"EXHIBIT D" 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1 
15 
16 
i : 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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M l | " M U EAR , 1 '. Il I i i HH'1 M. '. I I MONI 
* 0'; C QUID NOT ') N C L U D E WIT H A N i' C E R T A I N 1 Y 1 H [' A C T U A L (. AI IS E 
- 3E T R E E S ? 
i n M i M 1 H A N i" T P T A ! k , " r v k,~ 
MR. C H R I S T H A N S E N . ,,.^.,,. ,v J. I ! 1AVE NO 0T H E R 
II I ill S I I ME 
J U D G E YOl ING' R E D I R E C T ? 
R E D I R E C T E X A M I N A T i N 
BY MR, B E C K E R : 
Q K . • M & k r 
AT THE BASE uF " M *KLE 
I Il Il I I E R E A 
W I FEU N 
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"EXHIBIT E" 
1 «.»LjA-rir T M U K p p p Q p T BECKER R E F E R S 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
T n M •- f-'At^ '->-{•/K* <•» ''-»K • A L S A M O N 3-. ' ) i I REMENT S 
U i n t 
T u p . T « - ,
 M . • : : F R A i r G f- * % -' -1 , D E 
B Y M Y . *E 
- F E S ON .'"jR -, J r>p f f *Hfc P R O P E R 1 - , i ' T - ' t N . - v 
U u c i N ' ^['K - v ^ ~ ^ • . E D 
T R E E S , ^ , J * ' ™ p P» 
C A - ' W * vt - 'ETHEP * ' - - S O i F - . E ; E N P A N " : ' A S E - -
12 
13 
1 I 
15 
16 
1 ] ' 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
J U D G E ^ M i M : 
T M p p p COMPTMIMr " 
: A : I Of' ! 
< ; T c • 
: N I ) , OP ' ^ 0 - '. D HAVh AN 
^ . B E C K E R : N O # 
^f ,F • - I GMT . L E T ' r. *' -E 
Il E M A i b O E V E R 
-; L A I n N » '• i ^ - M A b h - . • - ' , I H U .- > . Q T w F P P 
• ' • . \ - f M i ' . \ i ^ > ( - EGF J, T A l ! Q r C r A - ^ ' . N 
I N 
HE f .OMp i . u ! N i \ T H U S , ^ L P U N I ; | v r U A M A . j t . i u ~ . v ' - L 
T - A T L E A V E S ONI Y TH I I. A U L I 01 A> I I . iM 
1 4 CI 
1 $4,500.00 WHICH IS LEFT AS TO A TRESPASS CAUSE OF ACTION 
2 AND/OR THE CAUSE OF ACTION, SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS 
3 TO TRESPASS. THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS AS TO THE INTENTIONAL 
4 POISONING OF THE TREES. AND THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
5 IS ONE IN WHICH THE COURT WOULD DEAL WITH 78-38-3 AND 
6 ITS APPLICATION AS TO WHETHER TREBLE DAMAGES MIGHT BE 
7 AWARDED. 
8 SO THAT PUNITIVE CAUSE OF ACTION IS DISMISSED. 
9 NOW, AS TO THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION. 
10 THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THE APPROPRIATE CONCLU-
11 SION TO THIS CASE IS THAT THE DIRECTED VERDICT BE GRANTED. 
U AND I WILL GRANT THE DIRECTED VERDICT. 
13 NOW, LET ME JUST MAKE A COUPLE OF COMMENTS 
14 IN RELATION TO MY OBSERVATIONS OF THE END OF THIS CASE, 
15 AND THEY ARE THESE. THAT IT'S CURIOUS TO ME THAT NO ONE 
16 ASKS EITHER MR. OR MRS. OLSEN WHETHER THEY POISONED THE 
17 TREES. THAT QUESTION WAS NEVER ASKED ON DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
18 NOR DID THEY ASK WHAT THEIR GARDENING PROCEDURES WERE 
19 IN THAT SPACE BETWEEN THEIR HOUSE AND THE TREES. THAT, 
20 TO ME, I THOUGHT, WAS CURIOUS AS TO WHY THERE WAS NOT 
21 ANY DIRECT QUESTION ASKED IN RELATION TO THAT. THIS LEAVES 
22 THE CASE ONLY WITH THE COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS 
23 AN UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE THAT THE TREES DIED AND THERE 
24 is NO TESTIMONY, IN FACT--MR. LABRUM, HIS TESTIMONY THAT 
25 i NOTED STATED "THAT HE CANNOT CONCLUDE WITH ANY DEGREE 
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1 I nc rPPT A 
I M fi M Y T i > L K 
4 . . . . . . ;.... 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
13 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
23 
24 
2 
C- ' • • M - O M i ' . L U D t ' H A 1 -1> -1-
;
 " I M I i n c D E F E N -
D A N T C A U S E D ' H h P R O B L E M . 
IN U W , 1 
COT v r T r t F M f . F n K I T H ; 
(. IR f - . iMC • . , . .
 r • (OSE T R E E S A L O N G -A 
' ' • • i l r^E 1 S - < \ NF ->F< ' . N A T E 
K E u - A i 
UNFOR FUNA 1 E . 
I IHINF IT'S UNFORTUNATE ALSO THAT THE CHILDREN 
m i s L i » * I ON 
' <t COMPL - : * v" . f - • - •. T W P Y n r 
m t K L D * E V I D E N C E - ' * 1Nr ^N P R O P E R T Y 
D P C I I I T n r > 
w i-J - " ^ "^  i- A 
• i j - S ' u E P M- * E B E t A i s E oh 
- * J ! M A I . KH' s Y 
U N H ' J k i ; N M ' r r p A >. j • 
' h- - * " 4[ : P i h ' A ' ; ' r 1 1 " 
' " A f N U C A* 
A T M i l " 
: ^ *, • \ r i N u ' - ~ " - ~ ! ^ E C T E D 
n A v t D i A^ Al SO F ' ND 
L_
 A j . T OM T M A T • ' "! I ( Ui«J 1 
' R E E S M . ^ :^E R E M O V K l ) , 
I I «J 7i I) 
1 DAYS FOR THAT TO BE CONCLUDED. IN FACT, I WILL ALLOW 
2
 if5 DAYS FOR THAT TO BE CONCLUDED AND THAT WILL PROVIDE 
3 YOU WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER YOU WISH 
4
 TO APPEAL THIS CASE, AND IF YOU DO, YOU MUST SEEK FROM 
5 THE APPELLATE COURT A STAY FOR THE REMOVAL. 
6 I THINK FURTHER COMMENTS NEED NOT BE MADE. 
7
 I'VE INDICATED THAT THE DIRECTED VERDICT IS GRANTED. 
8 THAT CONCLUDES THE CASE AND THE MATTER I S — 
9 MR. BECKER: CAN I ADDRESS THE COURT FOR A 
10 SECOND, YOUR HONOR, PLEASE? 
11 JUDGE YOUNG: PLEASE. 
12 MR. BECKER: FOR THE PURPOSES OF MAKING APPLI-
13 CATION TO HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE THAT COVERS THIS PROPERTY, 
14 AS PART OF THE ORDER DISMISSING THIS, DOES THE COURT FIND 
15 BASED UPON MR. LABRUM'S TESTIMONY THAT SOME TYPE OF 
1* POISONING KILLED THE TREES? 
17 JUDGE YOUNG: I CAN'T FIND THAT. MR. LABRUM'S 
18
 TESTIMONY, IN HIS OWN LANGUAGE, IS THAT--AND I QUOTED 
19
 HIS LANGUAGE. 
20
 MR# BECKER: I BELIEVE THAT WAS WITH REFERENCE 
21
 TO MR. CHRISTIANSEN'S QUESTION OF WHETHER IT WAS GASOLINE 
22
 OR ALCOHOL OR SALT OR SOME OTHER CHEMICAL SUBSTANCE THAT 
** KILLED IT. AND AS I RECALL, MR. LABRUM SAID HE COULDN'T 
24
 TESTIFY AS TO CETAINTY WHAT KILLED IT. WHEN I ASKED HIM— 
25
 JUDGE YOUNG: IT SEEMS TO ME THAT MAY BE A 
l < f 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 1i£ day of September, 
1990, pursuant to Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, I served four (4) copies of Appellee's Brief to 
the counsel for Appellants by hand delivering those same 
copies to the following: 
Dean H. Becker 
Attorney at Law 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 
WMMU ) 
lent\L./ Chris t iansen 
Attorney for Appellee 
